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Abstract 
Protection from hackers on networks is currently of great importance. Recent examples of victims include the recent repeated 
hacking of Sony PS3, which involved 24.6 million customer accounts being vulnerable, and the hacking of websites both includ-
ing US and Canadian government sites. Thus there is a drear need for effective Intrusion Detection and Prevention systems. 
Anomaly intrusion detection is a popular method of detecting Intrusions on Computer Networks. In 2011, Wilson and Obimbo 
proved that the use of Self-Organized Feature Maps (SOFM) could be used to increase the performance on KDD-99 dataset. This 
paper introduces a vote-based ranking system for intrusion detection based on SOFM. The experimental results are promising 
and are an improvement in both Wilson and Obimbo’s system and the Winning system of the KDD IDS Competition. 
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1. Introduction 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention has become a pertinent part of network security. An example of a 
vulnerability capitalized on was the recent hacking of Sony Play-Station Network, which resulted in the alleged 
stealing of 24.6 million accounts [1]. In 1994, just in US alone, the cost of systems downtime to companies was 
placed by some estimates at $4 billion a year, with a loss of 37 million hours in worker productivity [2]. This 
numbers are most likely higher today. These losses mainly arise due to DoS, User to root and Remote to Local 
attacks, which are events that can be evaded with effective Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems. 
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are popularly applied to Intrusion Detection Systems. However, their 
performance so far have not been satisfactory. Beghdad [3], reported low detection rates in many ANNs. Sabhnani 
and Serpen [4] even claimed that no machine learning algorithms could work on KDD99 for network intrusion 
detection [5]. Nevertheless, in 2010, Wilson and Obimbo [6] described a use of SOFMs for IDSs, and generated 
better results than the winner of KDD Cup competition. This renews people's view on applying ANNs on network 
intrusion, and makes future researches on using SOFMs for IDSs becomes feasible and sound. 
This research focuses on developing a vote-based ranking system by using self-organizing feature maps (SOFMs) 
[7], which is one fully developed algorithm of ANNs, on improving anomaly detection for IDSs. In Wilson and 
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Obimbo’s research [6], the SOFMs yielded a reasonably good classification rate, while achieving a low false 
positive rate. The SOFMs also have advantages on unsupervised training process, and identifying attack types.  
The vote-based ranking system is a novel approach for detecting intrusion. This system creates several SOFMs 
trained differently instead of one to improve the precision on classification rate and reduce the false positive rate on 
each type of attacks. The idea behind this is SOFMs generate good results when using small dataset [8]. Therefore, 
each SOFM is trained using a relatively smaller dataset compared to the whole training data set (i.e. 10% of the data, 
but only from 2 to 3 specific types of attack, instead of all 5 of them). After training SOFMs, intrusion types are 
detected by a master system, which calculates ranks for each SOFM. 
2. Related Work 
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems 
An Intrusion Detection System can dynamically monitor the events happening in a system, and identify whether 
they are attacks or legitimate accesses [9]. IDSs can be categorized as Misuse Detectors, Anomaly Detectors, or a 
Hybrid of the two. This research deals with Anomaly Detection, and so we shall major on these. Anomaly detection 
uses the assumption that unexpected behaviour is evidence of an intrusion. They can further be categorized as 
specification-based (these are a set of rules from human experts which provide the basis of bias that help determine 
“good/normal” behaviour), and behaviour-learning-based, in which the Detection System automatically learns the 
behaviour of the system under normal operation. 
Rule based IDSs such as Snort and Bro use human-crafted rules to determine known attacks[10,11], for example, 
virus signatures and requests to nonexistent services or hosts. However, anomaly detection systems such as SPADE 
[12], NIDES [13], PHAD [14], ALAD [15] compute (statistical) models for normal network traffic and trigger 
alarms when a large deviation from the norm is found. 
The work of Wilson et al [16] describes an intrusion detection system that is most similar to our work. Their IDS 
is based on generating a Self-Organizing Feature Map based on known intrusions, which are categorized as Probe, 
User-to-root, Remote-to-local, and Denial-of-Service, and also normal data, based on the KDD data set. They use 
the Euclidean distance to determine the Hotspot Vectors, which are then used to categorize the various categorize 
the various payload provided. They also do Vector-pruning (see Section 4), to eliminate the least significant 
hotspots, and this reduces false-positives. The results obtained in Wilson et. al.’s work show a significant 
improvement from the KDD Cup winner’s in the category of User-to-Root, being able to detect 63% correctly, 
compared to 15% for the KDD Cup winner. 
 
2.2 KDD-99 Dataset 
In 1999, Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) Cup competition was held for building a network 
intrusion detector on KDD-99 dataset. Since that time, KDD-99 has become a benchmark for IDSs. 
The KDD-99 dataset is derived from DARPA 1998 dataset. DARPA-Lincoln datasets are collected by MIT's 
Lincoln laboratory, which is under the DARPA ITO and Air Force research Laboratory sponsorship, to test the 
capability of different intrusion detection techniques. In the DARPA 1998 dataset, the data was collected from 
victim UNIX hosts for nine weeks, and the total dataset is about 4 gigabytes of compressed binary TCP dump file 
[17]. These connections belong to 38 different attacks which each falls into one of the following categories: Denial 
of Service Attack (DoS), Probing Attack (Probe), Remote to Local Attack (R2L), and User to Root Attack (U2R). 
In 1999, the TCP dump files were pre-processed for the International KDD Cup competition as the IDSs 
benchmark. In the TCP dump file, packet information transfer into connections. “A connection is a sequence of TCP 
packets starting and ending at some well defined times, between which data flows from a source IP address to a 
target IP address under some well defined protocol [18,19].” And totally 41 features are generated in each 
connection. 
KDD-99 dataset has three components, which are  
described in Table 1. 10% KDD-99 is only used for the 
training purpose, and this dataset includes 22 attack types. It 
can be viewed as simple version of the Whole KDD-99. The 
Corrected KDD-99 has different statistical distributions from 
either 10% KDD-99 or Whole KDD-99, and it contains 14 
additional attacks. So the Corrected KDD-99 is employed for testing.  
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3. Self-organizing Feature Maps 
Self-organizing Feature Maps (SOFMs) are also called Kohonen's Maps, because the theory of SOFMs was first 
raised by Finnish academic Dr. Teuvo Kohonen [7]. SOFMs are typical unsupervised neural networks. The concept 
of “supervised” and “unsupervised” is based on whether the results or outputs can be predicted or not. Supervised 
training process always contains input pattern and a desired output, and adjusts the network to more likely generate 
desired results. In contrast, unsupervised training process does not have desired output; the network has to find out 





SOFMs contain two layers: one layer for the input vector, and the other a feature map for outputs or clusters. 
Each neuron in the feature map is completely connected with input vectors by weights. Figure 1, shows a basic 
architecture of a SOFM.  
 
3.2 Initialization 
There are three factors that need to be determined before 
training SOFMs.   
1.The size of feature map. Choosing a suitable size of map 
can improve the accuracy of output by reducing the 
overlap area [7]. The nodes in the output layer adheres to 
the rectangular topology which easily maps to Cartesian 
plane. 
2.Iteration time. Though training the feature map for a 
long time might give a better accuracy, one has to 
determine the “optimal” training time for the relatively 
desired accuracy.  
3.Selection of a Neighbourhood function: a 
neighbourhood function needs to be selected that adjusts the nodes around a candidate node. The neighbourhood 
should shrink with time. The most common neighbourhood function for SOFMs is the Gaussian curve. 
4.  
3.3 Training 
After the initial setup, the SOFMs start to learn. And the training process contains three phases: competition, 




Competition is the first phase of training process. It generates the candidate node in the feature map. The 
activation of each neuron is calculated by equation (1), where X represents m-dimension input vector, and wj is 
weights between input and output layer. Initially, the value of weights is randomly set. 
;      ;                    (1) 
The node with the largest activation becomes the centre of the topological neighbourhood. It is called winner, or 
candidate node. Then the training process enters into cooperation phase. 
 
3.3.2 Cooperation 
In this phase, the neighbourhood around the winner is identified by the neighbourhood function. The 
specialized Gaussian Curve is used for SOFMs:   
 
h j,i  e
 dij
2




             
where j is one of a set of cooperating nodes (neighborhood), i is the winning node, dij is the distance between i 
and j, σ is the parameter which controls the width of the neighborhood. 
Fig. 1: SOM Neural Network 
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Shrinking the neighborhood allows large areas to form earlier during training, and eventually become more 
defined. This process is controlled by adjusting σ during training. And the formula of decay function for σ is showed 
in (3), where n represents time, σ0 is the initial width, and p1 is a constant between 0 and 1. 
 








Once the neighbourhood has found, learning rate and weights connected on the neighbourhood nodes need to be 
adjusted. The weights are updated by: 
 
w j n 1   w j n D u h j,i(X ) u X w j n    (4)  
where Ƚ is learning rate, X is the input, h is the neighbourhood nodes, and j is the winning node. With repeated 
presentations the weights tend to follow the distribution of input vectors. The learning rate can maintain the same 
during training, or decrease by time. Exponential decay is not generally optimal, but it is normally sufficient. 
4. Methodology 
This section will describe the adjustments for input data, the working principle of ranking system, and the 
methods that used in experiments. 
 
4.1 Data Preprocessing 
For generating better results, the data need to be normalized. Large value of attribute in input vector can greatly 
affect the competition in SOFM. Therefore, before putting data into SOFM, normalization should be processed to 
make each attributes in vector are equally treated in SOFM. The normalization function is chosen the same one in 
Wilson and Obimbo's paper [6]. Moreover, not all the features in KDD-99 become dimensions of input vectors. The 
redundant features (such as the duration time of a connection) are omitted. Therefore, the last 37 features in each 
row of dataset are analyzed in experiments. 
 
4.2 Training the SOFMs 
Training one SOFM is simple. First, read the data from dataset row by row; second, calculate or generate 
candidate node; third, adjust the neighbourhood; fourth, return to first step and read a new row, until the end of 
dataset. The details in these steps are described in Section 3. 
In this research, 10 different SOFMs are trained using the same parameters. Each SOFM is just trained two types 
of attack on it. After the training finished, the training dataset compared the feature map again. This time, each 
SOFM has a matrix to track the times of hits and the type of intrusion on certain node. These matrixes will be used 
for classification. 
 
4.3 Hotspot Vectors 
     The track matrix in each SOFM will determine the hotspots in the 
feature map. This helps in the classification process and reduces the 
complexity of the maps. Each hotspot creates a vector with Cartesian 
points. This method is similar to that used by Wilson and Obimbo [6], 
and it is also effective for multiple SOFMs. These new vectors are then 
compared to the ones already in the map, and calculations are done to 
determine overlapping vectors. The least influencing nodes are then 
eliminated from the map.  
     The number of hotspot vectors is showed in Table 2. Due to the 
overlapping nodes that may be eliminated,  as described above, the totals 
in the table are equal to or less than the sum of the two. 
4.4 Ranking System 
 
     After feature maps trained and hotspot vectors calculated, test data will go through each trained SOFM. The 
result from each SOFM is called vote. A vote indicated how close the input vector to a type of attack. The votes are 
measured by three factors: the distance between a hotspot vector, how many hits on the hotspot in training, and how 
many types of intrusion hits on it (in this research the most is two). 
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     A node is activated after an input vector is calculated by SOFM. This node will compare with the hotspot vectors 
which are near the node within a radius. The nearest hotspot vector will be selected. Then the vote is calculated by 
the formula (5), where hits represent certain type of attack that hits on this node, and totalHits is the number of total 
hits of the whole map. These votes collected from each SOFM are summarized as rank. The highest rank value on a 
particular type of intrusion represents the type of input. For instance, a raw data vector goes through the 10 SOFMs, 
and gets the highest rank on probe, and then this connection is probe attack. 
 
 
















5. Experiments and Results 
     Two distinct experiments were carried out. They use different distance measurement and ranking systems, and 
the results show different emphasis on intrusion types. 
5.1 Euclidean Distance Measurement 
     Euclidean distance is common method for SOFMs to check an input vector if it belongs to one cluster. The 
formula has stated before. Using this method is straight forward. The data in the testing dataset is imported row by 
row to a SOFM, calculated and compared with the existing map to find out the most similar node. 
     The distance between them computes the similarity between nodes. Then this node generates a vote on this 
SOFM. The same data gains votes from all SOFMs. The last step is check the intrusion type got from ranking 
system with the label on target input. Figures 2 and 3 show the results obtained using the various distance 
measurements. The columns of the tables below the graphs refer to the detectors and the rows are the actual 
intrusion types.  
 
 
Fig. 2: Result of Using Euclidean Distance Measurement  Fig. 3: Result of Using Customized Distance Measurement 
 
So in Figure 2 the 94% states that 94% of what the system categorized as DoS intrusion was correct, whereas below 
it, 11.20% of what the system categorized as DoS Intrusion were actually Probe attacks. The result, shown in Figure 
2, is similar to the results of Wilson and Obimbo [6]. However, they got more than 60% detection 
rate on Probe and U2R attack. The large misclassification occurs on Normal. Like R2L, most of these attacks are 
viewed as Normal by the ranking system.   
5.2 Novel Measurement Approaching 
     This experiment uses a novel concept to classify raw data. It still uses the same SOFMs and hotspots, but 
distance is not as a vote measurement any more. If we view feature map as universe, each node on it is a planet; two 
planets are close to each other does not mean one belongs to another, like the Earth and the Mars. The vote equation 
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uses (6), where hitsNode is the hits on the selected node. A node with more hits on it will be considered as the 


















The result is illustrated in Figure 3. It shows a great improvement on detecting Probe and U2R attacks, 94% and 
88.5% respectively. However, the false positive is also unbelievably high -- 100%. 
6. Conclusion 
     In the first experiment, if we do not change the distance measurement function, the result is similar to using only 
one trained SOFM [6]. The second experiment shows a great alteration on particular attack types -- Probe and R2L. 
It surely can be used to detect specific intrusions. 
     In the second experiment, comparing to Wilson and Obimbo's result [6], the ranking system improves the 
detection rate on Probe and U2R, and it also eliminates the overlap in hotspot vectors [6] due to only two intrusions 
data trained in each map. However, the low detection rate on DoS and R2L and the extremely high false positive are 
factors that need consideration in modification of the system, as the system cannot be used in it’s current state. In 
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